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This paper examines the incentives of controlling shareholders in the market for corporate control. We 
investigate the takeover premiums paid by a sample of European acquiring firms with concentrated 
voting rights structures. The results show a positive relationship between takeover premiums and the 
bidder’s  concentration  of both  voting  rights and excess  voting  rights  over  cash-flow  rights.  With 
higher  levels  of  bidder  entrenchment,  the  valuation  of  a  takeover  target  increasingly  reflects  the 
private benefits of control which bidders seek to extract from a deal. 
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I Introduction 
Mergers  and  Acquisitions  (M&A)  represent  distinct  managerial  initiatives  with  measurable 
consequences for corporate performance. A vast and growing literature on the performance 
implications of M&A finds that many deals lead to disappointing post-M&A performance. As a 
result, M&A are widely viewed through the prism of an agency cost framework (Shleifer et 
Vishny (1997); Erickson and Wang (1999). For instance, management may seek acquisitions 
not to create value for shareholders, but instead in an attempt to diversify their employment risk 
(by smoothing corporate earnings over time). Alternatively, managers may seek acquisitions in 
order to increase company size. This would allow managers to consume perquisites such as 
increased  prestige  and  executive  remuneration  in  the  post-M&A  period.  However,  when 
ownership structure in bidding firms is concentrated, the main merger-related conflict of interest 
between  managers  and  dispersed  shareholders  is  replaced  by  concerns  over  how  large 
shareholders may use M&A to expropriate minority shareholders (La Porta, 2002). 
Controlling shareholders may expropriate other shareholders by investing the firm's resources 
such that to maximize their personal interests especially when investor protection is weak (Bae 
et all (2002)) or when voting rights exceed broadly cash-flow rights (Claessens et al. (2002); 
Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003)). When controlling a large share of the voting rights, shareholders 
are able to make strategic decisions such as acquisitions without significant opposition from 
minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders are, hence, likely to pay more for deals which 
satisfy their personal interests. Therefore, higher takeover premiums may be an indicator of the 
various private benefits which a controlling shareholder intends to extract from a deal. Private 
benefits  of  control  represent  the resources  extracted  by  the  control  coalition  which  are  not 
shared with minority shareholders. Such benefits are often pecuniary and involved opportunities 
for insider trading or inflated salaries where the controlling shareholder holds a position in the 
firm. However, the private benefits of control which controlling shareholders seek to extract 
from a deal may also be non-pecuniary such as enhanced prestige and reputation.  
As pointed out by Dyck and Zingales (2004), private benefits of control are difficult to observe 
and even more difficult to quantify in a reliable way. In this study, we employ the acquisition 
premiums paid by a sample of bidding firms with controlling shareholders as an indicator of the 
private benefits which bidders link to control.   
We base our study in Europe for a variety of reasons. First, concentrated ownership is the norm 
in most European countries.  Faccio and Lang (2002) report that 63% of publicly-traded firms in 
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of listed firms have a large shareholder who controls 20% or more of its votes (Gadhoum, Lang 
and  Young  (2005)).  Second,  most  European  firms  suffer  from  relatively  weak  investor 
protection regimes. This leaves controlling shareholders with fewer constraints when pursuing 
their private objectives. Finally, most European public firms are affiliated within a business 
group (Faccio, Lang and Young (2001)). Bae et al (2002) show that within diversified business 
groups, controlling shareholders may exert power over subordinated firms which is in excess of 
the cash-flow rights. The devices enabling a shareholder to control a firm while retaining only a 
small fraction of the cash-flow are pyramidal groups, cross-holding and dual or multiples class 
share  structures.  Generally,  these  mechanisms  allow  controlling  shareholders  to  entrench 
themselves within the firm and to circumvent monitoring mechanisms put in place by minority 
shareholders.  
Previous empirical studies which highlight the relationship between ownership structure and 
M&A offer mitigated results. Most of these studies attempt to explain the merger motives of 
controlling shareholders. Johnson and al (2000) show that controlling shareholders use M&A to 
create  groups  of  firms  which  transfer  resources  for  their  own  benefit.  Bigelli  and  Mengoli 
(2004) study acquisitions by listed Italian firms and find that when acquisitions occur within a 
pyramidal group, the price may be set so as to transfer wealth from those companies located in 
the  bottom  of  the  pyramidal  chain  to  companies  situated  at  the  upper  levels.  Holmen  and 
Knopmf (2004) find that in Swedish mergers with dual owners (who control both the bidder and 
the target), there is a transfer of wealth from bidders to target shareholders. Dual owners are 
more likely to initiate diversifying mergers and they overpay for targets with higher ROA in 
order to overcome capital constraints within their pyramids.  
However,  controlling  shareholdings  may  not  necessarily  extract  private  benefits.  Instead, 
controlling  shareholders  may  play  an  active  governance  role  and  monitor  management 
activities. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) were among the first to discuss the role of the large 
shareholder as a monitor who and creates shared benefits for all equity holders. Kaplan and 
Minton (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) show that firms characterized by the presence 
of large shareholders are more likely to replace managers due to their poor performance. La 
Porta et al. (2002) find higher valuations of firms with more concentrated cash-flow rights held 
by the controlling shareholder.  
Consistent  with  this  view,  some  studies  reject  the  hypothesis  that  controlling  shareholders 
expropriate minority shareholders in the market for corporate control. Buysschaert, Deloof and 
Jergers (2004) find positive and significant cumulative abnormal returns for Belgium firms up 
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sales to create more transparent firm groups. Ben Ammar and André (2006) and Faccio and 
Stolin (2006) do not confirm that controlling shareholders use M&A to extract private profits. 
These authors suggest that good legal and extra legal institutions can make such expropriation 
too costly for the controlling shareholders.  
 
To examine whether a bidder’s controlling shareholder experiences private wealth from M&A 
transactions, previous studies focus on the performance around the announcement date using 
event study methodology (Bae et al (2002); Holmen and Knopmf (2004); Buysschaert, Deloof 
and  Jergers  (2004);  Ben  Ammar  and  André  (2006)  and  Faccio  and  Stolin  (2006))  or  the 
operational performance (Tze Yu Yen and André (2007)) or the return differentials of equity 
with different voting rights at the announcement date (Bigelli and Megnoli (2004)). In this 
study, we examine the expropriation of private wealth by bidders by analyzing the premium 
offered  in  a  deal.  Studies  which  focus  on  control  block  transactions  have  considered  the 
premium as a measure of private benefits of control. Arguably, it may be misleading to use 
acquisition premiums as a measure of private benefits in general samples of M&A because 
premiums also reflect the expected deal synergies for which an acquirer is prepared to pay.  
However, our study focuses on the special case of M&A initiated by bidders with concentrated 
voting  rights.  In  this  case,  the  major  corporate  decisions  are  made  by  the  controlling 
shareholder. We may therefore assume that the controlling shareholder is willing to overpay for 
deals  which  satisfy  his  or  her  personal  interests.  Higher  takeover  premiums  can  then  be 
interpreted as a proxy of the private benefits which the bidder’s controlling shareholder intends 
to extract from an acquisition.  
Our  approach  to  approximate  the  private  benefits  by  using  acquisition  premiums  follows 
Barclay and Holderness (1989), Barclay and Holderness (1991), Bebchuk (1994), Burkart et al 
(2000),  Nicodano  and  Sembenelli  (2004),  Dyck  and  Zingales  (2004),  Atanasov  (2005)  and 
others. These studies analyze the premium linked to private block sales of voting shares. In 
public transactions, there are usually legal rules that require the equal treatment of all target 
shareholders.  However,  in  our  case,  we  are  interested  basically  in  the  expropriation  of  the 
minority shareholders in the bidder. We conceptualize the overpayment for targets as an agency 
problem  between  controlling  shareholder  and  minority  shareholders  within  the  bidder. 
Therefore, by analyzing bidder ownership structure, our contribution is to show that takeover 
premiums reflect the private benefits in public takeover transactions as well.  
Our findings can be summarized as follows. The main finding reveals a positive relationship 
between  takeover  premium  and  the  entrenchment  instruments  of  the  bidder’s  controlling 
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level of separation between the ownership and the control when the cash-flow rights are low or 
when the bidder is controlled through other corporations. Within these ownership structures, we 
interpret our result as evidence that acquisition premiums reflect the private interests of the 
controlling shareholder. We also find that bid premium in a concentrated voting rights setting 
are positively affected by the activity relatedness of bidder and targets and negatively affected 
by the bidder’s leverage as well as a number of other bidding firm characteristics. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the methodology including the 
data sample and the variables. In section III, we report our analysis. Section IV summarizes and 
concludes.  
 




We obtain our sample from Thomson Financial’s Mergers and Acquisition Database (SDC). We 
collect data for deals which were announced by bidding firms located in Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the UK between 1994 and 2001. We excluded exchange offers, repurchases, recapitalizations, 
self-tender  offers,  spin-offs,  acquisitions  of  minority  interests  (less  than  10%).  Further,  we 
restricted to transactions deals where there was a reported transaction value or price per share. 
Both bidders and targets are publicly traded firms. 
We merge merger data with ownership data from Faccio and Lang (2002). Faccio and Lang 
(2002)  provide  ownership  and  group  affiliation  data  for  5,232  firms  from  13  European 
countries.  The  ownership  data  are  collected  from  various  sources  between  1996  and  1998. 
Barclay and Holderness (1989) find that once a firm has a large block shareholder (independent 
of whether the blockholder or a representative sits on the board of directors), the firm usually 
has a blockholder five years later. Hence, we choose our sample period as 1994 - 2001. 
Following Cronqvist and Nilson (2003), we define a shareholding as controlling if a single 
shareholder controls more than 25% of the voting rights. Cronqvist and Nilson (2003) note that 
shareholdings of 25% of voting rights tend to be sufficient to control a firm’s main corporate 
decisions. 
Finally, we verified various deal characteristics (announcement date, deal value, etc.) against 
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supplied by Thomson Financial and the information provided by the press coverage. Further, we 
exclude deals which are linked to the exercise of a call option on the target’s shares. In these 
cases, the takeover premium is likely to have been determined by factors prevailing at the time 
period the option was underwritten. Finally, bidders must have financial and accounting data on 
the Datastream / Worldscope database. This leaves us with a final sample of 231 deals by 
bidders with concentrated voting rights structure.  
 
II.2 Acquisition Premiums 
As standard in the literature, we define the premium as the excess of the price paid for the target 
above  its  pre-acquisition market  value  four  weeks (28  days)  before the  announcement  date 
supplied by Thomson Financial (e.g., Jarrell et al (1988); Jarrell and Poulsen (1989); Sharma et 
al (1991); Cotter and Zenner (1994)). Four weeks allows for adequate time to avoid information 
leakage (Nathan and O’Keefe (1989)) and it is short enough to avoid contamination effects from 
other events (Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy (2003)). Premiums are computed using market data 
from Datastream in the following manner: 
Price per share  -  Target stock price 4 weeks before the announcement date 
  Premium = 
Target stock price 4 weeks before the announcement date 
 
 
II.3 The Model 















+∑ control + Oi         (2) 
  
OWNERSHIP is a vector of ownership variables that includes the percentage of voting rights 
held by the bidder controlling shareholder (votes); the percentage of cash-flow rights held by the 
bidder controlling shareholder (own) ; a dummy variable equals one when there is a separation 
between ownership and voting rights (sepa); the excess of this separation as the percentage 
difference between ownership and voting rights (excess); a dummy variable equals one when  
the firm has outstanding non-voting, limited voting or multiple voting shares (dual); a dummy 
variable which equals one if the controlling shareholder controls the bidder through other firms 
(indirect) and a dummy variable which is equal one when there is one other owner that controls 
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The vector of control variables include the relative size of the target compared to the bidder 
measured by target total assets divided by bidder total assets (Rsize). This variable helps us 
understand if bidders value the opportunity to grow fast via M&A. Then, we include three 
bidder specific variables. Since we focus on agency conflicts between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders, we use the dividend payout ratio (DPR) measured as the ratio of 
dividends to net income (in the last twelve months). Firms that use to pay higher dividends are 
constrained not to waste funds; therefore, we expect that the dividend payout ratio will be 
negatively related with takeover premiums. Second, we include the ratio of cash flows to net 
sales (CFS). We assume that bidders with high cash flows are in a better position to overbid. 
Third, we include bidder leverage as measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets one year 
prior to the acquisition (leverage). We assume that highly leveraged bidders are less likely to 
engage  in  negative  net  present  value  projects  and will, hence,  be less likely  to  overpay  in 
acquisitions. Consequently, we expect a negative association between leverage and takeover 
premiums. 
We also include a number of deal control variables. First, we include the number of bidders that 
bid for a target (Nbidders). We expect that a high number of bidders stimulates the target’s 
bargaining power and, thus, increases the takeover premium.  Second, we control for if a bidder 
has previously held a toehold in a target (toehold).  We use a dummy variable which is equal to 
one when the bidder has held shares in the target before the announcement. If the bidder holds a 
significant part of the target’s equity before the offer, it may implement a pressure on target 
managers. We expect large toeholds to be negatively related to bid premiums. Third, we control 
for the industrial relatedness between bidder and target (relatedness). We include a dummy 
variable which is equal to one if the acquiring and target firms share the same 2-digit SIC code. 
We expect that controlling shareholders will be paying higher premiums for unrelated deals, 
because, this type of deal is more likely to serve their private interests. Fourth, we include the 
method of acquisition payment through a dummy variable which is equal to one when the 
payment is 100% cash (payment). Through cash payment, the controlling shareholder is more 
likely  to  keep  its  control.  Moreover,  stock  payment  may  be  linked  to  higher  acquisition 
premiums if bidders believe their equity is overvalued. Finally, we control respectively for the 
value of the transaction (size_tr), whether or not a deal is hostile (hostility) (control contests are 
likely to drive up premiums), and whether or not the deals takes the form of a tender offer 
(tender). Tender offer are market offers which require all shareholders to be treated equally. We 
expect that controlling shareholders in the target are unable to fetch a higher takeover price in 
privately-negotiated  transactions.  Therefore,  tender  offer  should  be  positively  related  to 








































0  - 7 - 
Country  control  variables  include  first  real  GDP  growth  (GDPG)  measured  to  proxies  for 
changes in economic conditions. Second, we include the ratio of the number of domestic firms 
listed in a given country to its population (in millions) (market) as a proxy for the liquidity of 
local stock markets. Stock markets with a higher number of traded firms tend to be more liquid 
and as a result the informational efficiency of assets traded on these exchanges will be different 
from that of country with few listed firms. We hold no a prior expectations as regards the 
impact  of  this  variable  on  merger  premiums.  Finally,  we  include  government  effectiveness 
(govern) which combines various indicators of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies. We find in unreported correlation tests, that the two last variables are 
highly correlated, we include only one of them depending in each model. 
 
II.4 Descriptive statistics 
Panels A, B and C of Table 1 report respectively the number of premiums by year, by country 
and by industry. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables. The mean of our 
dependant variable, the PREMIUM is 44.39%. This does not indicate particular overpayment 
behavior by firms with concentrated voting rights. Laamanen (2007) finds that the average 
premium paid in acquisitions has been between 40% and 50% over the past 20 years. The 
separation between ownership and control and its devices do not seem to be the rule in our 
sample. Only one-third of the bidders have ownership structures where voting rights exceed 
cash-flow rights. Roughly, one in four bidders have dual-class share structures and 20% have of 
a  controlling  shareholder  monitoring  bidders  indirectly.  The  mean  of  the  variable  of  other 
blockholders (33.76%) is similar to that in Laeven and Levine (2008) who find that over one-
third of listed firms in Europe have more than one large owner.  
One the other hand, the mean of industrial relatedness (54.11%) does not show a particular 
preference for unrelated deals. However, pure cash payment represents more than 65% of our 
sample. In studies which examine general merger samples which do not require ownership 
criteria, the pure cash payment is less than 50% (38.7% in Betton et al (2009); 40.4% in Moeller 
et al. (2004); 37.6% in Dumontier and Petitt (2002); 35.4% in Andrade et al (2001)). So, we 
suggest  that  bidders  with  concentrated  voting  rights  prefer  to  finance  acquisitions  via  cash 
payments. This is because controlling shareholders intend to maintain their position of control 
and stock payments may dilute this position. Consistent with this, Faccio and Masulis (2005) 
find  that  incentives  to  choose  cash  are  particularly  strong  in  bidding  firms  with  relatively 
concentrated ownership structures. Eckbo (2009) argues that bidding firm managers opt for cash 
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In  order  to  determine  how  the  incentives  of  bidder  controlling  shareholder are  reflected  in 
takeover premiums, we examine, in a multivariate setting, the relationship between takeover 
premiums  and  the  extent  to  which  bidding  firm  shareholders  exert  control  as  well  as  the 
arrangement which underlie this. The following sections examine the effects of voting rights, 
cash flow rights and excess voting rights, respectively. 
 
III.1 Voting Rights and Premiums  
Claessens et al (2002) indicate that the positive incentive effect relates to the share of cash-flow 
rights held by large shareholders and the negative entrenchment effect relates to the share of 
control held by large shareholders. The concentration of voting rights in the hands of a single 
controlling  shareholder  may  reduce  the  effectiveness  of  governance  mechanisms  within  a 
company and weaken its disciplinary. The controlling shareholder may easily divert corporate 
wealth and expropriate minority shareholders. Holderness (2003) argues that blockholders have 
the incentive to use their voting power to consume corporate resources or to enjoy corporate 
benefits that are not shared with minority shareholders. Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) 
provide a theoretical model which suggests that tight control of large shareholders constitutes an 
ex ante expropriation threat that reduces managerial initiative and non-contractible investments. 
Holmen  and  Knopmf  (2004)  find  that  dual  owners  improve  their  control  in  the  bidder  by 
acquiring  more  voting  rights  when  other  shareholders  are  likely  to  oppose  an  acquisition. 
Therefore,  if  the  premium  reflects  the  private  benefits  of  control,  it  should  be  positively 
associated with the voting rights held by the bidder controlling shareholder. 
                                                         [Insert about here Table 3] 
 
Table  3  presents  the  results  of  our  linear  regressions  of  premiums  on  voting  rights.  After 








































0  - 9 - 
characteristics and country indicators, we conclude from the first model that voting rights affect 
significantly and positively the premium. Moreover, we use the square (as in McConnel and 
Servaes (1990) and (Faccio and Lasfer (1999)) and the cube (Short and Keasey (1999) and Tze 
Yu Yen and André (2007)) of the percentage of voting rights held by the controlling shareholder 
in order to capture the impact of high levels of ownership.  The three first models show that as 
voting rights increase, the impact on the premium becomes more significant. Model 4 shows 
that  at  lower  level  of  voting  rights,  the  impact  becomes  negative  but  insignificant  and 
significantly positive at higher levels.  Using this last model, we found that the inflexion point, 
i.e., the level where the voting rights start to have a positive impact on premiums is 41.70% 
which is close to the voting rights median (42.5%). Bozec and Laurin (2008) note that dominant 
shareholders can still use the control granted by high levels of voting rights to expropriate 
minority shareholders.  
 
In order to confirm the last result of Table 3, in Table 4 we split our main explanatory variable 
‘votes’ into four levels: below and above the median sample (42.5%), below the first quartile 
(30%) and above the third quartile (54.5%).  
 
[Insert about here Table 4] 
 
Model  1  of Table  4  shows  that  below  the  first  quartile, the  voting  rights  do  no  affect  the 
premium. This result continues to hold even when we drop financial control variables to have 
more observations (Model 2), when we focus only on ownership variables (Model 3), or when 
the voting rights are below the median (Model 4). However, when the voting rights are greater 
than the median (Model 5), the coefficient of voting rights becomes positive and significant at 
10% threshold. More than the third quartile, the coefficient remains significant at 10% threshold 
(Model  6)  and  becomes  highly  significant  at  5% threshold  when  we  drop  financial  control 
variables to have more observations (Model 7) and highly significant at the 1% threshold when 
we focus only on ownership variables (Model 8).  
 
These results show that, at higher levels of voting rights, the premium reflect the incentives of 
controlling shareholders looking for M&A. As the entrenchment effect becomes dominant at 
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III.2 Cash Flow Rights and Premiums  
La Porta et al (2002) find that higher cash-flow ownership is associated with less expropriation 
of minority shareholders. Therefore, higher cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder may 
act as an important incentive in acquisitions. Furthermore, in managerial ownership cases, as the 
stake held by managers increases, they are less inclined to make decisions that against the 
interests of minority shareholders. La Porta et al (1998) show that the ownership concentration 
can be a substitute for low investor protection. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that the 
benefits from concentrated ownership may be relatively larger in countries that are generally 
less developed and where property rights are not well enforced by judicial systems. Hence, more 
concentrated ownership can consequently lead to less private benefits of control. In those cases, 
the acquisition decision can be undertaken in order to promote the general wealth of the firm. 
However, we should mention that previous studies offer equivocal results as results the effects 
of ownership effects on firm performance. Stulz (1988) finds a concave relationship between 
firm value and managerial ownership. Morck et al (1988) find a non-linear relationship between 
firm  value  and  managerial  ownership  with  the  positive  effect  of  ownership  beyond  25%. 
Moreover, Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) argue that unobserved firm heterogeneity 
complicates the estimation of the ownership performance relationship. 
 
[Insert about here Table 5] 
 
Model 1 in Table 5 shows that the cash-flow rights have no impact on premiums. This result 
continues to hold when cash-flow rights are greater than the median (38.6%) (Model 2) and 
greater than the third quartile (51.4%) (Models 3 and 4) or when we use the square of cash-flow 
rights (Model 5). Previously, we expected to find a negative effect because the increase of cash-
flow rights aligns the incentives of controlling shareholders with the interests of other investors; 
hence, controlling shareholders are less inclined to make sub-optimal decisions, such as, target 
overpayment. But, we mention also that the real effect of higher ownership can not be clearly 
expected due to the possibility of entrenchment effect. Our result can be due to the number of 
firms  having  no  separation  between  ownership  and  control:  almost  of  the  controlling 
shareholders in our sample have cash-flow rights that equal voting rights and, as far as, voting 
rights have a positive and significant effect, the cash-flow rights could not have a negative 
effect. As a robustness test, in Model 6, we regress the premium on cash-flow rights only for 
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the coefficient of cash-flow rights becomes negative; however, it is still insignificantly different 
from 0. 
 
III.3 Separation, Excess of separation, Means of Separation and Premiums 
 
The concept of separation between ownership and control closely linked to expropriation by 
minority shareholders and negative effects on firm value. Claessens (2002) notes that in non-US 
firms the largest shareholder often establishes control despite having low cash-flow rights. This 
in turn could involve potential agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders. 
Bigelli and Mengoli (2004) find that bidder announcement returns are significantly lower when 
the separation of ownership and control in the bidder is high. Therefore, if the premium reflects 
the  private  benefits  of  control,  we  assume  that  the  premium  is  positively  related  to  the 
separation, the excess of separation and the different means of separation. However, according 
to the Model 1 of Table 6, the coefficient of separation between the ownership and the control is 
insignificantly different from 0. 
 
[Insert about here Table 6] 
 
Moreover  and  in  consistence  with  previous  studies,  the  behaviour  of  expropriation  is 
accentuated when the separation between the ownership and the control is high and the cash-
flow rights held by the controlling shareholder are basically low. Faccio and Stolin (2006) admit 
that the expropriation takes place when the controlling shareholder’s ownership is low. Bozec 
and Laurin (2008) add that the incentives to extract private benefits of control are even stronger 
when the cash-flow rights of the dominant shareholder are low. 
 
Thus, if the premium reflects the private benefit of control, it should be highly related with the 
degree of separation when the cash-flow rights are low. In order to check for this assumption, 
first, in unreported test of equality, we use a t-test for the level of separation by the median of 
cash-flow rights. Obviously, we find that the coefficient of the separation is quite higher (t-stat 
= 4.90) for the lower cash-flow rights subsample (less than the median (38.6%)). 
 
Second, we run a regression of the premium on the main separation variable focusing on this 
part  of low  ownership. The  finding  of  this specification  is  consistent  with our  assumption, 
Model 2 of Table 6 shows that the coefficient of separation becomes positively significant at 5% 
threshold. Therefore, we can admit that the premium reflects the private benefits of control in 
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As noted by Faccio and Lang (2002), in western European corporations, the separation between 
the ownership and the control comes from different mechanisms including dual class shares, 
pyramids,  cross  holding,  multiple  control  chain.  These  mechanisms  allow  the  controlling 
shareholder to maintain grip on control while holding only a small fraction of cash-flow rights.  
 
Furthermore, we use other measures of separation, the excess of separation and the main means 
of separation basically the dual class shares and the indirect control using mostly pyramids. In 
Model 3 of Table 6, the coefficient of the excess of separation is also insignificant. In Model 4, 
dual class shares do not seem to have an impact on premiums; however, in both Models 4 and 5, 
the coefficient of indirect control is positive and statistically significant at 5% threshold. This 
result is quite conform with the assumption which implies that when the controlling shareholder 
monitor the firm through pyramids or multiple chain of control, he can make decisions that 
don’t coincide with the interests of the firm but rather with the interests of other companies that 
are  closely  controlled  by  him.  Many  studies  document  that  pyramiding  is  the  main  device 
allowing the entrenchment of large controlling shareholders. In this area, Bertrand et al (2002) 
show that there is more expropriation of firms further down pyramids. Furthermore, Bigelli and 
Mignoli (2004) argue that the high separation of ownership from control achieved through the 
concurrent use of stock pyramiding could favor acquisitions made to increase private benefits of 
the controlling shareholders rather than all shareholders’ wealth. Wolfenzon (1999); Bebchuk et 
al (2000) and Claessens et al (2002) report that the expropriation arise when the corporation is 
affiliated to a large group of corporations, all controlled by the same shareholder. Faccio and 
Stolin (2006) note that group structures allow controlling shareholders to divert the resources of 
a  company  further  down  the  pyramid  by  transferring  assets,  by  lending  or  borrowing  at 
nonmarket  rates,  by  guaranteeing  other  companies  borrowing  or,  generally,  by  “unfairly” 
pricing  transactions  with other  corporations higher in  the  pyramid  in  which  the  controlling 
shareholder has a larger ownership stake.  
 
III.4 Other implications  
Outside the US, controlling shareholders are seldom surrounded by only atomic shareholders. 
Over  one-third  of  publicly  listed  firms  in  Europe  have  more  than  one  large  owner.  Those 
blockholders play an active governance role in reducing the magnitude of control of the ultimate 
shareholder and disapproving harmful business decisions. Lehman and Weigand (2000), Maury 
and Pajuste (2005) and Laeven and Levine (2008) show that firm valuations decrease when the 
difference between the two stakes held by the largest and the second shareholder intensifies. 
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benefits  of  control.  Therefore,  we  assume  that  in  the  presence  of  other  blockholders,  the 
controlling  shareholder  is  more  constrained  to  pay  less  for  targets  and  we  expect  that  the 
premium will be negatively associated with the presence of other blockholders. However, all 
regression tables show that the presence of other blockholders does not affect the premium 
amount. In spite of their governance role, blockholders do not seem to have an influence on the 
magnitude  of  the  premium  paid.  Other  studies  (Bolton  and  von  Thadden  (1998);  Zwiebel 
(1995)) show also that the presence of other blockholders might not be sufficient to contrary 
controlling  shareholders  decisions  or  to  reduce  expropriation  of  minority  shareholders. 
Moreover, those shareholders can sign agreements or concerted actions with the controlling 
shareholder and create together a coalition of control allowing them to make common decisions 
at the expense of minority shareholders. Faccio et al (2001) find evidence that the blockholders 
collude in expropriating outside shareholders in Eastern Asia. 
 
In our study, all models in which we do not use any specification
1, show that the coefficient of 
industry relatedness is significantly positive and the coefficients of bidder’s toehold, leverage 
and  the  ratio  of  cash  flow  /  sales  are  significantly  negative.  Our  finding  for  the  industrial 
relatedness is similar to Bae et al (2002) that argue that, usually, synergies are more pronounced 
for  related  acquisitions.  However,  in  unreported  univariate  analyses,  we  find  that  more 
concentrated voting rights are associated with unrelated deals. Amihud and Lev (1981), Shleifer 
and Vishny (1990), Lins and Servaes (2002) and Pecherot-Petitt and Dumontier (2002) suggest 
that  unrelated  acquisitions,  which  diversify  the  firms’  holdings,  are  not  mainly  aimed  at 
common  interests  of  bidder  shareholders.  They  serve  first  to  improve  the  acquiring  firm 
manager’s job security by diversifying the risk of their human capital that cannot otherwise be 
properly diversified.  
 
When the bidder has a previous toehold in the target, this is associated with lower premiums. 
Bidding toehold reducing the offer premium  was discovered at first by  Betton and Eckbo 
(2000). Kisgen et al (2009), Betton et al (2009) among others find a similar result. According to 
agency theory, higher level of debts or leverage reduces the incentives of managers towards 
wasteful  projects,  thus,  they  are  less  inclined  to  overpay  targets.  This  assumption  is  also 
confirmed through our findings for concentrated voting rights bidders. Schwert (2000) don’t 
find significant result. Besides, in Table 4, we observe that at low level of voting rights that are 
normally  associated  with  lower  premiums,  the  coefficient  of  leverage  is  insignificant  but 
becomes significantly negative at high level of voting rights.  
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Our unusual result is the coefficient of the ratio of cash flow/sales which is quite significantly 
negative. In consistence with our perspective, the cash flow, as a generator of free cash flow and 
agency costs, is more likely to be correlated with the amount of the premium. In unreported 
analysis,  we  swap  this  ratio  by  the  ratio  of  cash  flow/total  assets,  the  coefficient  becomes 
positive. Thus, our first negative coefficient can be due to the weight of sales. Moreover, Table 
4  shows  this  coefficient  moves  from  highly  negative  when  the  voting  rights  are  low  to 
insignificant when the voting rights become higher, therefore, we assume that the cash flow 
increase with the voting rights held by the controlling shareholder.  
 
Concerning the relative size of the target, in consistence with Slusky and Caves (1991), we find 
also no statistical significant effect on the premium.  Gondholekar, Sant and Ferris (2004) use 
target  market  equity  scaled  by  bidder  market  equity,  they  find  a  negative  impact  at  1% 
threshold, we find also no statistical significant effect. 
 
The dividend payout ratio does not affect negatively the premium as we expected previously. 
The role of dividend policy as a disciplining mechanism can be reduced when the controlling 
shareholder  hold  an  internal  position  within  the  firm.    Moreover,  Holderness  and  Sheehan 
(2000) find that the dividend payout ratio is lower in individual majority-shareholder firms. 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) show that large blockholdings, is related to a significantly lower 
payout ratios. 
 
The payment method does not seem to have an impact on premiums; Kisgen et al (2009) also do 
not find that the payment method affect the premium.  Gondholekar, Sant and Ferris (2004) use 
target  market  equity  scaled  by  bidder  market  equity,  they  find  a  negative  impact  at  1% 
threshold. 
According to Eckbo (2009), we did not find a significant effect of multiple bidders on the 
premium. Slusky and Caves (1991), Schwert (2000) and Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy (2003) 
find  a  positive  effect  on  premiums  at  1%  threshold.  Also,  according  to  Eckbo  (2009),  the 
hostility of the deal does not seem to affect the premium. Rossi and Volpin (2004) find a 
positive effect on premiums at 1% threshold. Schwert (2000) create several variables to measure 
hostility and find a negative effect on the premium of the principal component of variables with 
complete data. 
 
Usually, tender offers are costly than mergers or other types of acquisitions (Easterbrook and 
Fischel (1996)). Schwert (2000) and Rossi and Volpin (2004) find a positive effect on premiums 








































0  - 15 - 
Our analyses do not reveal a significant result. Finally, none of the control country variables has 
an impact on the premium. 
 
IV Conclusion 
In this paper, we find strong evidence that the premium offered in M&A can be affected by the 
entrenchment of controlling shareholders. Therefore, we argue that the premium is an indicator 
for the private benefits of control. Our results show that target overpayment is positively and 
significantly associated with higher level of voting rights, as well as, the level of separation 
between  the  ownership  and  the  control  when  cash-flow  rights  are  low.  Furthermore,  when 
controlling shareholders exert control via other corporations, takeover premiums increase as 
well. Previous papers show that the premium reflects the private benefits in privately negotiated 
transactions (mainly block transactions). In the present study, we show that the premium can 
also reflect private benefits in public transactions. 
 
European firms are characterized by a strong legal environment and broad extralegal institutions 
which make the issue of expropriation by majority shareholders less prevalent. Our results show 
that controlling shareholders are able to further their private objectives even if these objectives 
do not overlap with the interests of the non-controlling shareholders. These results provide an 
empirical  support  for  previous  studies  that  suggest  that  the  expropriation  of  minority 
shareholders is an important principal agent problem in European acquisitions. 
 
Nevertheless, even if the private benefits are consumed by bidding firm shareholders, we should 
not  forget  the  important  role  of  controlling  shareholders  in  the  organization.  For  example, 
Holmen and Knompf (2004) suggest that some of the mergers are motivated by dual owners’ 
desire to provide additional equity funds to capital constrained firms within their pyramids. 
Furthermore, we should also mention that private benefits and shared benefits are not mutually 
exclusive (Holderness (2003)). Thus, the incentives of controlling shareholders can coincide 
with those of the other shareholders. Further studies should pursue these issues in order to 
develop  appropriate  governance  tools  to  constrain  detrimental  takeovers  made  by  bidder 
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: number of premiums per year   
Year  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  Total 
N  8  14  9  26  29  56  66  23  231 
 
Panel B: number of premiums per country   
Acquiror 
Nation  Austria  Belgium  Finland  France  Germany  Ireland  Italy 
N  7  18  4  43  30  4  16 
Acquiror 
Nation  Norway  Portugal  Spain  Sweden  Switzerland  United Kingdom 
Total 
N  8  8  13  16  15  49  231 
                                                         
Panel C: Number of premiums per Industry 





Power  Financials  Health  
care  High Technology 
N  22  18  18  41  5  9 
Industry  Industrials  Materials  Media and 
Entertainment  
Real 
Estate  Retail  Telecommunication 
Total 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
variable  N  Mean  Median  St.Dev  p5  p95  
  231  44.39343  35.5205  40.22453  -1.00672  132.2438 
VOTES  231  45.91333  42.5  17.35326  25  81.7 
OWN  231  40.1081  38.6241  19.70879  10  75 
SEPA  231  .3376623  0  .4739397  0  1 
EXCESS  231  5.805229  0  10.74953  0  30.7184 
OTHER  231  .3376623  0  .4739397  0  1 
DUAL  226  .2477876  0  .4326862  0  1 
INDIRECT  231  .1991342  0  .4002164  0  1 
RSIZE  189  .3394636  .1785646  .4180676  .0025561  1.063065 
LEVERAGE  225  .2944751  .267641  .2314022  .0021955  .7771733 
DPR  211  .370734  .317746  .3431514  0  1.053874 
CFS  192  .1453302  .1047032  .1725854  .0000506  .4492536 
NBIDDERS  231  1.047619  1  .2834277  1  1 
TOEHOLD  231  .4545455  0  .4990109  0  1 
RELATEDNESS  231  .5411255  1  .4993879  0  1 
PAYMENT  231  .6536797  1  .47683  0  1 
SIZE_TR  231  1060.268  180.968  4553.113  6.635  3599.748 
HOSTILITY  231  .030303  0  .1717921  0  0 
TENDER  231  .5757576  1  .4953007  0  1 
GDPG  231  1.204934  1.223197  2.222847  -1.23281  3.673023 
MARKET  231  16.94  12.66  12.00796  3.91  35.68 
GOVERN  231  92.62294  93.4  4.626929  80.6  100 
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Table 3                                                 
Voting Rights And Premiums 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
              
VOTES  0.375**      -1.477 
  (0.0367)      (0.117) 
VOTES2    0.00406**    0.0176** 
    (0.0151)    (0.0459) 
VOTES3      4.96e-05***   
      (0.00722)   
OTHER  3.716  3.260  2.673  0.582 
  (0.551)  (0.597)  (0.662)  (0.927) 
RSIZE  -11.40  -10.92  -10.31  -8.635 
  (0.141)  (0.155)  (0.177)  (0.266) 
DPR  -0.947  -1.159  -1.278  -2.141 
  (0.920)  (0.901)  (0.891)  (0.818) 
CFS  -53.16***  -52.61***  -51.84***  -49.56*** 
  (0.00570)  (0.00591)  (0.00639)  (0.00942) 
LEVERAGE  -28.44**  -27.84**  -27.03**  -25.34* 
  (0.0383)  (0.0413)  (0.0465)  (0.0635) 
NBIDDERS  19.21  19.21  19.14  18.84 
  (0.135)  (0.132)  (0.132)  (0.138) 
TOEHOLD  -16.52***  -16.39***  -16.33***  -16.52*** 
  (0.00710)  (0.00721)  (0.00717)  (0.00653) 
RELATEDNESS  13.46**  13.69**  13.85**  13.51** 
  (0.0302)  (0.0267)  (0.0243)  (0.0280) 
PAYMENT  -9.120  -8.964  -8.757  -8.445 
  (0.162)  (0.167)  (0.175)  (0.191) 
SIZE_TR  -0.000148  -0.000145  -0.000142  -0.000143 
  (0.796)  (0.800)  (0.803)  (0.802) 
HOSTILITY  -8.338  -7.476  -6.269  -2.410 
  (0.671)  (0.702)  (0.747)  (0.902) 
TENDER  -6.291  -6.345  -6.507  -6.679 
  (0.307)  (0.300)  (0.286)  (0.273) 
GDPG  -1.314  -1.402  -1.468  -1.569 
  (0.266)  (0.234)  (0.211)  (0.183) 
GOVERN  0.560  0.548  0.540  0.477 
  (0.394)  (0.401)  (0.406)  (0.464) 
Constant  -13.58  -5.303  -2.089  36.44 
  (0.837)  (0.935)  (0.974)  (0.603) 
 
Observations  159  159  159  159 
R-squared  0.256  0.264  0.270  0.276 
F  3.272  3.411  3.531  3.387 
Note. - The dependant variable is the premium computed as the difference between the price per share offered and 
the target stock price four weeks before the deal announcement, divided by the target stock  price four weeks before 
the announcement. Our sample period is from 1994 to 2001.  All models comprise 159 deals with complete values for 
all variables. For the OLS regressions estimates, p-values are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See 
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Table 4  
Level of Voting Rights And Premiums 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4   Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Low levels of voting rights   High levels of voting rights  
  <1st quartile  <1st quartile  <1st quartile  <median    >median  >3rd quartile   >3rd quartile   >3rd quartile  
25% - 30%  25% - 30%  25% - 30%  25%-42.5%  42.5%-100%  54.5%-100%  54.5%-100%  54.5%-100%  
                  
VOTES  -1.522  1.797  1.397  -0.305  0.511*  1.380*  1.222**  1.260*** 
  (0.694)  (0.520)  (0.584)  (0.629)  (0.0973)  (0.0575)  (0.0261)  (0.00829) 
OTHER  -7.596  -3.520  -4.370  -3.893  -3.953  14.52  0.869  -6.610 
  (0.594)  (0.730)  (0.667)  (0.616)  (0.684)  (0.391)  (0.955)  (0.610) 
RSIZE  -8.149           -18.43     
  (0.757)           (0.304)     
DPR  -13.86           35.19     
  (0.500)           (0.221)     
CFS  -125.3***           -16.78     
  (0.00594)           (0.671)     
LEVERAGE  -18.04           -63.17**     
  (0.664)           (0.0293)     
NBIDDERS  0  -12.71    -21.52  12.21    -40.15   
  ()  (0.538)    (0.263)  (0.352)    (0.415)   
TOEHOLD  -6.689  1.050    -13.13*  -13.82    -19.77   
  (0.695)  (0.924)    (0.0720)  (0.114)    (0.212)   
RELATEDNESS  -5.669  13.68    10.26  4.449  22.96  -0.158   
  (0.691)  (0.177)    (0.154)  (0.601)  (0.157)  (0.990)   
PAYMENT  -8.970  7.312    0.892  -2.164  -8.670  13.56   
  (0.595)  (0.544)    (0.905)  (0.813)  (0.666)  (0.346)   
SIZE_TR  0.00539  0.00625    0.000818  -0.00143  -0.00212  -0.000180   
  (0.365)  (0.237)    (0.242)  (0.310)  (0.245)  (0.916)   
HOSTILITY  0  0    0  -2.186  -23.36  -7.165   
  ()  ()    ()  (0.908)  (0.604)  (0.798)   
TENDER  -9.058  -18.23*    -1.687  2.714  10.15  23.77   
  (0.526)  (0.0817)    (0.821)  (0.757)  (0.527)  (0.125)   
GDPG  2.515  1.990    -1.228  -3.316*  4.682  -1.379   
  (0.493)  (0.459)    (0.459)  (0.0729)  (0.496)  (0.800)   
MARKET  -0.403  0.692    0.00426  -0.257  -0.560  -0.689   
  (0.603)  (0.158)    (0.989)  (0.475)  (0.450)  (0.351)   
Constant  134.6  -8.338  10.34  78.98**  15.58  -43.11  -2.533  -43.44 
  (0.273)  (0.922)  (0.884)  (0.0231)  (0.563)  (0.484)  (0.966)  (0.179) 
                  
Observations  43  62  62  117  120  36  59  59 
R-squared  0.386  0.179  0.010  0.077  0.099  0.456  0.198  0.118 
F  1.404  1.115  0.309  0.879  1.085  1.418  1.056  3.747 
Note. - The dependant variable is the premium computed as the difference between the price per share offered and 
the target stock price four weeks before the deal announcement, divided by the target stock price four weeks before 
the announcement. Our sample period is from 1994 to 2001.  Models 1 and 6 comprise deals with complete values for 
all variables. Models 1, 2 and 3 include 62 deals in which the bidder‘s controlling shareholder has voting rights less 
than the first quartile (30%). Model 4 includes deals in which the bidder‘s controlling shareholder has voting rights 
less than the median (42.5%). Model 5 includes deals in which the bidder‘s controlling shareholder has voting rights 
greater than the median (42.5%). Models 6, 7 and 8 include 59 deals in which the bidder‘s controlling shareholder has 
voting rights greater than the third quartile (54.5%). For the OLS regressions estimates, p-values are in parentheses 
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Table 5 
Cash flow Rights And Premiums 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
OWN  0.170  0.366  0.662  0.770    -0.0160 
  (0.282)  (0.195)  (0.217)  (0.227)    (0.954) 
OWN2          0.00304   
          (0.194)   
OTHER  2.612  -12.08  2.931  -0.541  2.803  2.304 
  (0.679)  (0.228)  (0.857)  (0.969)  (0.655)  (0.851) 
RSIZE  -10.57        -10.44  -19.34 
  (0.176)        (0.232)  (0.277) 
DPR  -5.561        -5.711  12.23 
  (0.556)        (0.508)  (0.524) 
CFS  -56.42***        -56.27***  -90.35* 
  (0.00317)        (0.00207)  (0.0866) 
LEVERAGE  -28.45**        -28.26**  -46.31* 
  (0.0397)        (0.0247)  (0.0680) 
NBIDDERS  17.82  13.67  36.57    17.66  2.028 
  (0.169)  (0.321)  (0.186)    (0.182)  (0.905) 
TOEHOLD  -18.76***  -14.54  -16.35    -18.35***  -27.12** 
  (0.00338)  (0.109)  (0.356)    (0.00323)  (0.0209) 
RELATEDNESS  11.24*  -0.756  -4.690    11.59**  17.60 
  (0.0682)  (0.930)  (0.740)    (0.0434)  (0.116) 
PAYMENT  -9.870  -1.129  2.525    -9.618  -7.723 
  (0.146)  (0.899)  (0.863)    (0.175)  (0.578) 
SIZE_TR  -0.000117  -0.00172  -0.000986    -0.000114  -0.00116 
  (0.840)  (0.223)  (0.591)    (0.809)  (0.763) 
HOSTILITY  -6.109  -4.131  -12.44    -5.165  1.532 
  (0.758)  (0.856)  (0.732)    (0.600)  (0.955) 
TENDER  -4.974  7.486  22.52    -5.248  0.0359 
  (0.435)  (0.383)  (0.182)    (0.402)  (0.998) 
GDPG  -1.495  -0.313  2.728    -1.587  -2.053 
  (0.219)  (0.888)  (0.639)    (0.274)  (0.249) 
MARKET  -0.233  -0.250  -0.400    -0.196  0.219 
  (0.374)  (0.526)  (0.602)    (0.420)  (0.662) 
Constant  58.20***  21.31  -40.75  -6.454  58.24***  80.10*** 
  (0.00411)  (0.403)  (0.481)  (0.871)  (0.00296)  (0.00967) 
Observations  159  117  58  58  159  63 
R-squared  0.241  0.083  0.143  0.044  0.251  0.339 
F  3.032  0.864  0.698  0.749  3.513  1.607 
Note.- The dependant variable is the premium computed as the difference between the price per share offered and the 
target stock price four weeks before the deal announcement, divided by the target stock price four weeks before the 
announcement. Our sample period is from 1994 to 2001. Models 1 and 5 comprise 159 deals with complete values for 
all variables. Model 2 comprises 117 deals in which the bidder‘s controlling shareholder has cash-flow rights greater 
than the median (38.6%). Model 3 and 4 comprise 58 deals in which the bidder‘s controlling shareholder has cash-
flow rights greater than third quartile (51.4%). Model 6 comprises 63 deals with complete values for all variables and 
in which the variable of separation equal 1. For OLS regressions estimates, p-values are in parentheses *** p<0.01, 
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Table 6 
Separation, Excess of Separation, Means of Separation And Premiums 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
           
SEPA  5.220  16.36**       
  (0.405)  (0.0421)       
EXCESS      0.237     
      (0.366)     
INDIRECT        15.85**  16.72** 
        (0.0375)  (0.0279) 
DUAL        -2.811   
        (0.665)   
OTHER  0.985  6.098  1.601  -1.730  -2.544 
  (0.876)  (0.436)  (0.798)  (0.790)  (0.694) 
RSIZE  -10.26  -4.279  -10.33  -8.524  -10.26 
  (0.189)  (0.757)  (0.186)  (0.271)  (0.182) 
DPR  -2.402  5.853  -0.705  -1.677  -4.175 
  (0.795)  (0.636)  (0.941)  (0.856)  (0.646) 
CFS  -54.65***  -86.52***  -52.25***  -60.95***  -65.03*** 
  (0.00411)  (0.00508)  (0.00728)  (0.00198)  (0.000856) 
LEVERAGE  -29.33**  -14.25  -28.11**  -20.08  -28.86** 
  (0.0352)  (0.491)  (0.0431)  (0.159)  (0.0347) 
NBIDDERS  17.87  -244.8  19.54  20.54  20.21 
  (0.169)  (0.270)  (0.134)  (0.110)  (0.115) 
TOEHOLD  -17.70***  -15.78*  -17.82***  -19.79***  -17.73*** 
  (0.00407)  (0.0524)  (0.00420)  (0.00142)  (0.00348) 
RELATEDNESS  11.58*  16.55**  12.58**  13.84**  12.42** 
  (0.0612)  (0.0443)  (0.0453)  (0.0253)  (0.0422) 
PAYMENT  -9.640  -9.030  -9.969  -9.277  -10.79* 
  (0.145)  (0.326)  (0.135)  (0.163)  (0.0996) 
SIZE_TR  -0.000120  0.00478  -0.000169  -0.000139  -9.85e-05 
  (0.837)  (0.196)  (0.772)  (0.808)  (0.863) 
HOSTILITY  -6.147  -7.795  -6.693  -8.258  -8.917 
  (0.758)  (0.758)  (0.737)  (0.673)  (0.650) 
TENDER  -5.989  -6.903  -6.206  -5.186  -6.865 
  (0.335)  (0.387)  (0.320)  (0.405)  (0.263) 
GDPG  -0.943  -2.588*  -0.851  -0.0947  -0.635 
  (0.438)  (0.0804)  (0.487)  (0.943)  (0.595) 
           
Constant  57.13***  299.1  10.68  49.46***  56.72*** 
  (0.00145)  (0.175)  (0.872)  (0.00583)  (0.00130) 
           
Observations  159  86  159  156  159 
R-squared  0.233  0.372  0.237  0.242  0.255 
F  3.124  3.001  2.957  2.980  3.516 
Note.- The dependant variable is the premium computed as The difference between the price per share offered and 
the target stock price four weeks before the deal announcement, divided by the target stock price four weeks before 
the announcement. Our sample period is from 1994 to 2001. Models 1, 3 and 5 comprise 159 deals with complete 
values for all variables. Model 4 comprises 156 deals with complete values for all variables. Model 2 comprises 86 
deals with complete values for all variables and in which the bidder‘s controlling shareholder has cash-flow rights 
less than the median (38.6%). For the OLS regressions estimates, p-values are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
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Appendix: 
Variables description 
Name  Description  Source 
premium  The difference between the price per share offered and the target stock 
price four weeks before the announcement date, divided by the price 





own  The percentage of cash-flow rights held by the bidder‘s controlling 
shareholder 
own2  The square of the percentage of cash-flow rights held by the bidder ‘s 
controlling shareholder 
votes  The percentage of voting rights held by the bidder’s controlling 
shareholder 
votes2  The square of the percentage of voting rights held by the bidder’s 
controlling shareholder 
votes3  The cube of the percentage of voting rights held by the bidder’s 
controlling shareholder 
sepa  One if the percentage of cash-flow rights and the percentage of voting 
rights held by the bidder‘s controlling shareholder differ and zero 
otherwise 
excess  The difference between the percentage of voting rights and the 
percentage of cash-flow rights held by the bidder‘s controlling 
shareholder 
indirect  One if the bidder‘s controlling shareholder controls the firm through 
other firms and 0 otherwise 
dual  One if the bidder  has outstanding non-voting, limited voting or 
multiple voting shares and 0 otherwise 
other  One if there is one other owner that controls at least 10% of  voting 




Lang Data  
Rsize  Target total assets last twelve months  divided by bidder total assets 
last twelve months  
DPR  Common  dividend  last  twelve  months  divided  by  net  income  last 
twelve months 
CFS  Total cash flow last twelve months divided by net sales last twelve 
months 





Nbidders  The number of entities (including the acquirer) bidding for a target. 
toehold  One if the bidder has a previous participation in the target prior to the 
offer 
relatedness  One if the acquiring and target firms had equivalent 2-digit primary 
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payment   One if the acquisition is entirely paid in cash and zero otherwise 
size_tr  Deal size is defined as the total value of consideration paid by the 
acquirer (in million USD), excluding fees and expenses.  
hostility  One if the bid is classified as unsolicited and zero otherwise 
tender  One if the acquisition technique is a tender offer and zero otherwise 
GDPG  Real GDP growth equal to nominal GDP growth minus inflation. 
govern  Measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government’s commitment to such policies.  
Worldbank 
 
market  Ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its 
population (in millions). 
La Porta et 
al (1998) 
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